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Tax Aspects of Corporate Pension Funding Policy
ABSTRACT
This paper explores four models of firms' pension liabilities. All
of the models yield the result that if it is the stockholders who gain or
lose from a change in the market value of pension fund assets, a pension
fund invested entirely in bonds will maximize that gain. If a firm's
pension liabilities are considered to be no more than the present value
of accrued benefits, then most plans for salaried employees would maximize
the pension's value by having their assets entirely in bonds. However,
for less well funded plans such as most union plans, holding both stocks
and bonds or even all stocks may maximize the value of the firm.. Implicit
contracts on the liability side of the pension balance sheet can encourage
holding some stock, but implicit contracts on the asset side are likely
to encourage increased bondholdings.
Jeremy Bulow
Stanford University
Graduate School of Business
Stanford, California 94305
(415) 497—2160Introduct ion
What are the advantages of a firm holding all bonds, all stocks,
or a mix in its pension fund? Is a firm better off making the minimum
or maximum contributions to its pension plan? Does the firm's pension
funding policy matter at all to the stockholders?
The task of this paper is to clarify the crucial assumptions on
which the answers to each of these questions depend, and how those assumptions
affect the answer.
Models developed by Black [1980] and Tepper [1981], Sharpe [1976],
and Miller and Scholes [1981] are all discussed. An extended version of
the Sharpe model, actually drawing n all three earlier models, is also
presented.
The reasons for the differing results of the models can be classified
in two groups: assumptions about the asset side of the pension fund balance
sheet, and assumptions about the liability side. Sharpe's basic approach is
to look at the explicit terms of the pension contract. Black looks at the
explicit liabilities of the pension plan but both he and Tepper tend to treat
these liabilities as general obligations of the firm, Their model approximates
the Sharpe model except in cases where a plan termination would lead to losses
for the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). Miller and Scholes have
in mind a model with very complex implicit contracts between the firm and its
employees regarding pension benefits——assets backing pension liabilities may
well exceed the money in the fund, and pension liabilities may also exceed
the amount to which the firm has explicitly committed.
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1.The Black—Tepper Model
The thrust of the models of Black [1980] and Tepper [1980) can be
seen by taking an augmented balance sheet approach to pension fund analysis.
Black considers the pension fund liability to be no more than the accrued
liability of the pension plan——that is, the plan's explicit, legal liability.
(For a discussion of this concept of pension liability see Bulow [1979]).
Were it not for tax reasons, pension debt would be comparable to ordinary
debt. Furthermore, were it not for taxes bonds in the pension fund would
be a perfect hedge against either kind (ordinary or pension) ofdebt.1
The fact that bonds in the pension fund can offset ordinary
debt presents a tax arbitrage situation. Bonds in the fund earn the pre—
tax rate of return. Ordinary debt issued by the firm may be financed with
tax deductible interest payments. Thus, an extra dollar of ordinary debt
and an extra dollar of bonds in the pension fund provide a net tax benefit.
Unfunded pension debt, on the other hand, is very costly according
to Black and Tepper. If the firm does not establish a pension fund its employees
can contribute to an IRA account and earn the before—tax rate on bonds.
Thus, employees will only be willing to sacrifice current wages for a qualified
pension plan if they are offered the pre—tax bond rate. Furthermore, in a
competitive labor market if labor supply is inelastic and the firm could earn
the pre—tax rate by funding its pension plan such a rate of return would have
to be offered to employees.
The Black—Tepper analysis is formally derived below under two sets
of circumstances. In the first case, Merton Miller's [1977] argument that
there is no equilibrium advantage to corporate debt financing is assumed to
hold. In the second case, the result is examined in the situation where
there is a tax advantage to debt financing. A simplification that does not
alter the results here is that all corporate debt will be assumed to be riskiess.3
The fact that debt is assumed to be riskiess does simplify the
analysis in two ways: First, there are no problems involving the relative
seniority of pension debt. This enables us to abstract from issues relating
to the workers gaining security (at someone's expense) if more money is
placed in the fund. Second, worker security is unaffected by whether the
plan holds stocks or bonds. These problems are not major if it is assumed
that pension contributions and investment policy are implicity or explicitly
negotiated, If they are, the firm cannot gain at the expense of employees
through funding or investment policy, and the fact that the Black—Tepper model
as presented here abstracts from possibilities of this sort is unimportant.
Let V =presentvalue of firm's non—pension assets
S =marketvalue of stock held in the pension plan
B =marketvalue of bonds held in pension plan
D =marketvalue of firm's non—pension debt
L =marketvalue of bonds required to pay off all
pension liabilities accrued to date
X =maximumamount by which S + Bmay exceed L
=rateof interest on riskiess bonds
t =corporatetaxrate
That is, L is the present value of accrued pension liabilities, discounted at
the pre—tax nominal interest rate.
Consider a two period model. In the first period the firm contracts
for some pension liabilities, acquires real assets, and puts money into its
pension plan. The pension money is invested in stocks and bonds. Then to
maximize shareholder wealth the firm must4





S +B—L<X, S >0,B >0
if the Miller argument holds. The explanation of (1) is that the valueof
shareholder claims is equal to the present value of all the claims the firm
o'ns less the present value of the after—tax cost of paying off all bondholders
and pensioner claims.
The bonds held in the pension fund will earn a rate of returnr,
and thus be worth B(l+r6) at the end of the period. This amount mustonly
be discounted by the after—tax rater(l_t). Debt on the firm's balance
sheet costs rE (l—t) after tax, and must be discounted at thesame rate.
Finally, the firm will have to pay pension beneficiaries a rate of return
rc on pension claims because th3t is the rate they can earn in IRAaccounts
or, say, in defined contribution plans run by competitors. Stockholders,
however, will only discount these paYments by the after—tax bond rate of
rq(l—t). Also pension assets and liabilities are only worth 54 cents on
the dollar (l_t) because liabilities can be absolved withpre—tax dollars.
This version of the model assumes that firms can only contribute
the maximum amount deductible for tax purposes. Actually, as Tepperpoints
out, a firm can sometimes contribute beyond the deductible limit and gain tax
postponement benefits. Such benefits would not appear in a two—period model.
For any set of assets V and pension debt L the way to maximize
shareholder wealth is to set S =0and B =X+L.The value of D is
(B—L)rt
indeterminate. The gain from having a plan is
(l+r (1 ))•Thus,firms5
should fund entirely with bonds, and put as much money as possible into
bonds. If the plan is underfunded, the fir-rn loses because employees
could have earned rB on their own. For every dollar that the firm can
overfund, however, it earns the pre—tax rate of return while stockholders
only expect the post—tax rate on such riskiess securities.
Whereas legally a fir-rn is limited to operating a fully funded
plan, judicious choice of actuarial assumptions can actually enable a firm
to vastly overfund, For example, IBM has 5,000 million dollars in pension
assets and lists its pension liabilities at 5,000 million. However, the
liability figure is calculated by discounting future benefits at a 4—314
percent rate of interest. Using current interest rates would yield the
result that IB'1 is several billion dollars overfunded,
Now consider the case where there is a tax advantage to debt
financing via the tax deductibility of interest payments. Thus future debt
payments should be discounted at the pre—tax rate of interest. The manage-
ment's problem is then to
B(l+r)(l-t )D(l+r(l-t ))L(l+r)(l—t)





S >0,B >0,S -fB—L<X,D +L(l—t)—B(l_tc)k
where k the "debt capacity" of the firm.
The last constraint limits the amount of tax-advantaged debt that
the firm can issue, The assumption above is that (1) a dollar of pension
debt displaces a dollar of ordinary debt, and (2) a dollar of bonds in the
pension fund fully offsets a dollar of ordinary debt. This model can be6
dressed up so that the optimal amount of debt is endogenously determined
by perhaps some tradeoff between bankruptcy costs and tax benefits,but
the resulting analysis would be identical.
Solving (1.2) yields S0, BL + X, Dk +
(l—t )
Thatis,
the firm should try to issue as much ordinary debt as possible.The vay
to do this is to hold as many bonds as possiblein the pension fund,
because each dollar of bonds allows the firm toissue one more dollar
of ordinary debt.
There are a couple of points to make about the"non—Miller" analysis.
First, no one I know claims to understandmuch about "debt capacity.t' What if
the "debt capacity" constraint is different fromthat above: for example,
D + CL—B—
S)(l—t0)
<k(unfunded pension liabilities plus ordinarydebt
are less than or equal to "debt capacity").In this case, there is an
advantage to being funded to increasethe amount of ordinary debt the firm
can support, but no advantage to holdingbonds rather than stock in the
pension fund.
If debt capacity is proportional to a firm's beta (sothat there
are no tax advantages to diversification)then in a model where all
securities yield the same pre—tax returns adjusted forrisk holding zero—
beta stocks inthepension fund would yield the same tax advantage as
holdingbonds.(Of course, it may be quite difficult to create azero—beta
stock portfolio.) Ina Millerworld, zero—beta stocks have a lower pre—tax
returnthan bonds and are not a good pension investment. Thus,in a Miller
world the tax advantage of funding a plan is due to thefirm being able to
earn the pre—tax rate of returt' on bondsheld in the fund. The tax advantage
is directly related to the plan's interest income.In a non—Miller world the7
advantage of funding a plan is that the amount of ordinary debt that
the firm can issue is increased, and a bigger interest tax deduction is
received. Of course, in the non—Miller model selling bonds and acquiring
a zero—beta portfolio of stocks in other firms, with the stock held in
the corporation's general account, would provide the same tax advantage.
The contrast is most notable in the case of junk bonds which bear
a strong resemblance to equity. In the Miller model such investments are
ideal for pension funds because they yield taxable interest coupons that
exceed the risk—adjusted total return on the security. In a "debt—capacity"
model where the tax advantage came through increasing the amount of ordinary
debt one could issue, holding junk bonds would yield no advantage over
holding equivalent—risk equities in the pension plan.
Another point to make is that many firms may effectively be in a
zero marginal corporate tax bracket. Airlines and utilities often pay
very low current federal taxes. Oil companies have started paying the
last few years, but it is possible that they have political reasons for
wanting to pay income taxes. For such firms the tax value of extra "debt
capacity" is zero because there is no more tax liability to offset. Thus,
on the margin there would be no advantage to either funding a plan or
holdingbonds.2 In a Miller world, however, where the tax advantage arises
directly through the plan assets there would still be the same advantage
to putting bonds in a fund.
There may also be a tax advantage to timing contributions to allow
for changes in corporate tax rates. The corporate rate was as high as
(52.8 percent in 1970) and is now 46 percent. Further reductions are
possible. The individual firm may certainly find its tax rate changes
over the years.8
Also, it should be noted that there are ways for a corporationto
receive interest income taxable as dividends through the use of special
investment companies (see Bulow [1979)). If such tactics can be employed
at low cost then the tax advantage of being able to earn taxfree interest
would be significantlyaller.3
Sunmarizing, the firm must pay the pre—tax rate of return onits
pension liabilities. In the Miller world it derives a taxadvantage through
holding bonds in the plan that also earn a pre—tax rate of return.(Returns
on equity already reflect a corporate tax.)If the firm has more bonds than
are needed to cover its liability, it derives a tax advantagerelative to
having a defined contribution plan, In a non—Millerworld the tax advantage
of funding a pension plan is derived from the fact that increased plan
funding increases the amount of ordinary bonds the firm can issue, with
tax—deductible interest payments.
2. The Sharpe Model
Sharpe [1976) recognizes that directly adding the pension fund
to the balance sheet does not take into account the value of the pension
put. As an approximation, he takes the pension liabilities guaranteed by
the PBGC to equal the present value of eployees' claims, or roughly L in
the notation of the previous section. In Section 4 the Sharpe analysis is
extended to take into account the precise PBGC rules,
Again, resorting to the two—period model, the workers' claim is
fixed at L(l+r8) at the end of the second period. The firm owns the plan
assets, but has the right to put the liability to the government in return
for the plax assets plus 30 percent of the firm's equity. Equivalently, the
firm can be thought of as having a call on the plan assets with an exercise
price equal to L —.3E,where E is the market value of the firm's equity.9
This result derives from the fact that If pension assets are less than
-
guaranteedbenefits the firm has to make up the difference up to 30 percent
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of net worth.
In determining funding policy the firm must trade off, in a Miller
world, (1) the tax advantage to holding bonds in a pension fund and earning
the pre—tax rate of interest, and (2) gains the firm may make from the
government by putting the pension fund's assets to the government for L —.3E.
For any given level of pension funding the optimal investment strategy is to
hold either all stocks or all bonds. (Sharpe and Har:ison have proven that
this result will hold up in the multi—period context.) Generally, holding
bonds will yield a tax advantage so that the bonds in the fund have a
positive net present value while equity investments have a zero net present
value. However, the riskiness of the stocks may make a call option on the
equities more valuable than a call option on a portfolio of bonds. In
either event, either an option on a portfolio with 100 percent bonds or
an option on a portfolio with 100 percent stock will be at least as valuable
as an option on a portfolio containing positive amounts of both assets.
To see that you would want to hold either all stocks or all bonds
if you are choosing between just two assets, add the following notation:
VS =thevalue of a firm's call option in a pension fund's assets
if all the assets are invested in stock.
VB =thevalue of a firm's call option on a pension fund's assets
if all the assets are invested in bonds.
V =thevalue of a firm's call option on a pension fund's assets
if lOOn percent is invested in stock and the remainder in bonds.
the (uncertain) terminal value of each dollar's investment in
in stock. If aF is invested in stock at the beginning of10
the period the stock portfolio is subsequently worth
cFP.
=the(uncertain or certain) terminal value of each dollar's
investment in bonds.
Emarket value of firm's equity.
On exercise date
V =Max(0,FP5 + .3E —L)
VB =Max(O,FPB
.3E —L)
V Nax(0, oFP + (l_oDFPB + .3E—L)
That is, the firmwillonly exercise the call option and pay off
all liabilities if the sum of the assets in the plan plus thirty percent
of the market value of the firm's equity exceeds the present value of the
pension liabilities. By stochastic dominance, then, we can find that
Vc <aV5
+ (l—a)VB for 0 << 1.That is,
Max(0, aFP5 + (l_cz)FPB ÷ .3E —L)<
Max(O,cxFP5 + .3ctE —aL)+ Max(0, (l_cx)FPB + .3(1)E —(l—a)L)=
aNax(O,FPs + .3E -L)+ (l—a)Max(0, FPB + .3E —L)
So we know that on the last day an option on the portfolio containing
some stocks, bonds, and firm equity will be at most as valuable as a portfolio
of options on the same assets with the same cumulative exercise price. This
result is due to Nerton [1973]. Consequently, one would be at least as
happy today owning a of a call option with payoffs identical to those produced
by the all—stock portfolio and (1—a) of a call option with payoffs identical
to those produced by the all—bond portfolio as with an option on a portfolio
invested a in stocks and (1—a) in bonds.11
Once we have the result V <V
+(l_a)VBthe rest is easy:
ciV + (l_a)VB <Max(VVB). That is, unless the market value of the
call options yielded by the all stock and all bond portfolio are identical
one will necessarily prefer owning a call worth eitherV or VB rather
than some linear combination of the two.
Thus, combining two observations:(1) an option on a portfolio
is worth no more than a portfolio of options and (2) the weightedaverage
of the market values of the options in a portfolio of options must beno
greater than the market value of the most valuable option we find that a
firm cannot do better than a portfolio with either all stocks or all bonds.
Sharpe and Harrisson [1981] are working on a paper which will show
that in a multi—period model one will always want to hold either all stocks
or all bonds each period.
If the amount of money plus the value of thirty percent of the firm's
equity in the pension fund is low, stocks will likely be the better invest-
ment because holding bonds will guarantee that the firm's call option expires
worthless. If the fund has a great deal of money, the ability to put the
fund to the PBCC becomes less valuable and an all—bond strategy makes sense.
A further obvious implication is that if a firm adopts the all—
bond policy, and gives up on the pension put havingany value, the firm
should bepouringmoney into the pension fund as fast as itcan. This result
is similar to the Black—Tepper result, If, on the other hand, the firm's
decision is to go all equity there is no tax advantage toputting money
in the plan but the pension put becomes more valuable as less and lessmoney
is invested in the plan. Firms which are underfunded,then, might try to
minimize contributions and maximize the risk of the pension portfoliosubject
to whatever constraints are imposed on them by their actuaries1 interpretation
of ERISA.12
If the Miller model does not hold, the same "debt capacity" issues
that arose in the first section of the paper reappear. The tax advantage to
holding bonds instead of stocks would be determined by how much additional
"debt capacity" was created by holding bonds rather than stocks.
The primary conclusion of this type of analysis, then, is
that there is a tax advantage to holding bonds arid, often, an advantage
in terms of the value of the pension put to holding stocks. In the
simple example above, the firm would either hold as many bonds as
possible or as little stock as possible. However, it should be noted
that if the firm feels constrained to limiting the riskiness of its
pension portfolio it may do well to hold bonds plus very risky stocks
(or call options) rather than a portfolio with the same variance but all
equities. In the context of the Miller model, the tax advantage of holding
bonds earning the pre—tax rate is maintained while holding portfolio variance
constant means that the pension put has not been devalued. In Section 4,
when a more elaborate version of the PBGC rules are introduced, it will be
possible to have cases were the firm holds a portfolio with some stock and
some bonds even if portfolio choices are only between one bond mutual fund
and one stock mutual fund.
3.The Miller—Scholes Model
Miller and Scholes [1981], in an interesting paper, go beyond
looking at the explicit terms of the pension contract. They arguethat
defined benefit pension plans involve implicit contracts between the
firm and its employees.
There is something of a puzzle as to why defined benefit plans
exist, when from the point of view of defining the value of any employee's
claim and any employer's liability a defined contribution plan is so much13
simpler. e argument is that a definedbenefit plan can be overfunded
while a defined contribution plan cannot be, thus providing atax advantage
in the Sharpe and Black—lepper models to overfunding.Another reason, also
tax related, is that defined benefit plans systematicallybias the accrual
of pension benefits to older workers, who maywish to receive a higher
fraction of their total compensation in pensionbenefits than would
younger workers. Defined contribution plansare more limited as to
how much benefits can be tilted to older workers. However,it is
difficult if not impossible to find a firm that keeps asmuch money as
possible in its pension fund.(Though firms such as IBM and Morgan, Stanley
do have much more than enough to cover the present value of accrued liabilities.)
Also, Scholes argues that tax lawyers can probably find a way to tilt pension
compensation to older workers without resorting to a defined benefit plan.
Miller and Scholes suggest a third reason for the existence of defined
benefit plans. They contend that the point of tying benefits to salary is
to signal an implicit contract. The employee's pension is tied in part to his
final salary, and salary is tied to how well the firm does. If the firm
has a good year, the worker participates in the windfall through both
high salary and a pension based on that salary. If the firm does poorly,
the worker also participates by getting a lower salary and a pension based
on that lower salary. There is an ex—post settling up with workers having
an implicit agreement tying their fortunes to the firm.
Such a settling up could also be accomplished through bonuses or
just through raises to people receiving a defined contribution pension
benefit, but the defined benefit plan makes total compensation much more
sensitive to salary. Thus, if the firm and its employees wish to have total
worker compensation tied to the firm's eçuity but do not want the employee's
total non—pension compensation to change quickly, then a defined benefit14
plan with an implicit agreement tying salaries to the firm'sprogress is a
sensible idea.
While the Black—Tepper and Sharpe models both attributed to
the stockholders (or the PBCC) the gains or losses on thepension
portfolio, Miller and Scholes' view of the complex implicit contract
between the firm and the employees is that the stockholdersare often
out of the game completely.
Miller and Scholes argue that there are many similarities
between defined benefit and defined contribution plans. Whereas ina
defined contribution plan the workers explicitly benefit or lose from
any gains or losses on the pension portfolio, in a defined benefit plan
workers have an implicit contract giving them those same gains and losses.
However, the workers also hold part •of the equity of the firminthe Miller—
Scholes model. This equity can be held explicitly, to a limitedextent,
through shares of stock held in the pension fund. Mostly, itmay be held
in the form of treasury stock.
In a defined contribution plan, pension liabilities are perfectly
correlated with pension assets——if the stocks and bonds in the fund rise
in value the present value of the liability to the work force risesby the
same amount. In the Miller—Scholes interpretation of a defined benefit
scheme, pension liabilities are also highly correlated with pension assets——
including the company's ownstockthat is implicitly held.
While Miller and Scholes actually appear to have an extremely rich
model in mind, at the risk of being overly simplistic I will write downa
potential one—equation version.
Let C =thelevel of benefits guaranteed by the PBCC
PEequity in th firm implicitly included in pension assets
T =valueof emplo'ee benefits if the plan itm-iediately terminated.
S =currentmarket value of stocks held in the pension plan
B =currentmarket value of bonds held in the pension plan15
The model is:
(3.1)T Min(Max(G, S +B-I-FE),L(PE, S, B))
If the plan terminated at any moment the workers would receive
at least C——the amount guaranteed by the PBCC. If implicit plus explicit
plan assets exceeded C then in a termination the workers would receive a
package of benefits equal to the total value of the plan assets, up to a
maximum of L(pE, S, B). If the firm did well then both the asset and
liability side of the pension balance sheet would rise. However, we will
leave open the possibility that if plan assets became sufficiently great
the workers would not receive all of the gain.
In negotiating compensation for the coming period, the firm offers
workers a choice of packages of equal cost to the firm. Each package
defines a schedule L(PE, S, B), C, contributions to the plan, arid an invest-
ment policy. The firm is quite content for the employees to choose any of
the packages.
The workers may well choose a package consisting of some stocks
and some bonds. The simplest example is when neither the pension put or
the ability of the firm to call away the pension assets for L(PE, S, B)
has any chance of being effective. Then the value of the workers' claims
are exactly equal to S + B + PE. Just as workers in a defined contribution
plan may choose to hold some equities even if the net present value of debt
securities (because of tax reasons) is higher, the e.plovees in the defined
benefit plan may make the same decision.
There are two important, interrelated, questions that ust be asked.
First, what would happen if the plan became overfunded. For example, what16
if L(FE, 5, B) was a random variable equal to 15percent of the firm's
market value plus the value of 50 million dollars worth of stock and
40 million dollars worth of bonds, but the firm hadover $90 million
(say, $110 million) in the pension fund. Miller and Scholesagree if
a plan can be overfunded in this way it makes sense for the firm to
hold its share of the plan assets in bonds so as to earn thepre—tax
rate of return in a Miller [1977] world. However, they claim that
"The IRS will not allow corporations to fund a pension fund inexcess
of the pension promise" (p. 18). The IRS, though, confines itselfto
looking at the explicit terms of the pension contract and, as pointed out
earlier, many firms do in fact overfund their explicit pension liabilities.
Given that firms can overfund, one would, according to Miller—Scholes'
reasoning, expect any stockholder assets stored in the pension fund to
be held in bonds. Thus, the argument with the Black—Tepper andSharpe
models center around whether it is the shareholders, the employees, or
the PBGC whose wealth is correlated with the return on pension assets.
In all three models, if the stockholders are the beneficialowners of any
pension assets they desire to hold those assets in bonds.
A second question relates to the nature of the implicit contract
between the firm and the employees regarding the pension fund. In the
Miller—Scholes model the firm's own stock may be held by the plan in the
form of an unfunded liability. However, the employees have an explicit
claim on the stocks and bonds held in the plan and not on other securities
held by the firm. One might make an argument for a slightly more extensive
implicit contract of the following sort: the ecplovees receive a return on
a portfolio of stocks, bonds, and firm equity but the only assets held in17
the pension fund are bonds. For example, in the case above, employees
wanted 50 million dollars worth of stock, 40 million dollars of bonds,
and 15 percent of the firm's equity. W'nat if instead of holding 50
million dollars of stock and 40 million of bonds in the pension plan
the firm held 90 million of bonds in the plan, 50 million of stock
outside the plan, and borrowed 50 million dollars, with an implicit
agreement that the workers would get the return on the stock and the
firm would get the returns on the bonds in the pension plan. If such
an implicit arrangement were possible, an all—bond strategy for invest-
ment in the plan would again make sense unless more could be extracted
ex ante from the government through underfunding and making use of the
pension put. Thus, the Miller—Scholes model encompasses certain types
of implicit arrangements, but there are also some somewhat explicit
arrangements——e.g., that workers have a claim on pension fund assets
and some firm equity, rather than just a more general implicit claim.
This is not meant to be a criticism of the Miller—Scholes model; rather
a clarification of the kind of contracts they are referring to.
Myron Scholes has pointed out that essentially the same result
as the more extensive implicit contract can be achieved, in the context
of the Miller [1977] model by the plan holding mostly bonds plus some call
options and reproducing the riskiness of a portfolio of some sto'cks and
bonds. As mentioned earlier, in the Miller model the tax advantage of
having a plan is directly proportional to the amount of interest payments
the firm can receive in its plan on a tax—free basis. In a debt capacity
model the implicit contract arrangement does enable the firm to issue more
bonds on its own account to offset the bonds in the pension fund. However,
such a model does not yield any advantages to holding a bonds plus options18
portfolio: in the debt capacity model all taxadvantages come from
increasing debt capacity, and altering the pension portfolio'scomposition
but not changing its risk characteristics doesnothing to increase debt
capacity.
The Miller—Scholes model can also bepresented using the augmented
balance sheet approach. The balance sheet, fora firm with no ordinary
debt, looks like this:5
Assets Liabilities
Sstocks in pension fund
B =bondsin pension fund
V firm's non—pension assets
The liability is the one specified by theimplicit contract between
the firm and its workers. Firms are constrainedto not deposit more money
in the fund than the present value of the workers' totalimplicit pension
claims less the value of their claims on the firm'snon—pension assets.
By choosing the appropriate mix of stocks and bonds in thepension fund,
the fir-rn can perfectly hedge its pensionliability.
If the nature of the agreement is that theemployees own whatever
is in the pension plan, plus some fraction of otherassets, the firm should
be quite content to let employees choose the asset mix ofthe portfolio.
However, another interpretation of the implicit claim is that the workers
have a claim providing well—defined benefits in eachpossible state of nature
and what assets are held specifically in thepension plan does not alter
the nature of this claim.
L =firm'spension liabilities
E =stockholder'sequity19
In this case, the tax arbitrage scheme discussed above can be
employed. The firm should issue ordinary debt D in an amount equal
to S, the amount of stock needed to hedge out the pension claim. The
stock in the pension plan should be sold and replaced with bonds. The
proceeds of the debt issue can be used to acquire an equal amount of
stock on the corporation's own account. The net result: on an augmented
balance sheet basis assets are increased by SD and ordinary debt of D
is issued. It is clear that under either the Miller [1977] or debt
capacity model a tax gain is made: both the amount of bonds in the pension
fund and the amount of ordinary debt has increased. The firm is still
perfectly hedged against its pension liability: it is just that the stock
in other firms that it needs to hedge this liability is held outside the
pension fund instead of inside.
With the Miller model the firm can achieve the same, objective
approximately by holding mostly bonds plus a few options in the pension
portfolio: the tax advantage coming from holding bonds is still produced.
In the debt—capacity model the bonds plus options strategy does nothing for
debt capacity and hence provides no tax advantages.
Summarizing, Miller and Scholes see a defined benefit plan as being
much like a defined contribution plan with three major differences:(1)
workers are guaranteed a minimum benefit C; (2) workers have an implicit
claim on part of the firm's equity, and (3) workers may have a maximum benefit.
In the defined benefit plan the workers are the primary beneficial owner of
pension assets. If a fund does contain some assets of which the stockholders
are the beneficial owners, those assets ought to be bonds. The Miller—Scholes
analysis is the first analysis we have seen which allows for a strategy of
the firm holding some stock and some bonds in the pension plans.20
4. Extended Sharpe Model
A more extensive version of the Sharpe model, allowing for a
more detailed look at ERISA, and also considering the possibility of
certain implicit contracts on the liability side of the pension fund
balance sheet (but not on the asset side) also yields circumstances
under which the employees may be the ones who benefit from the returns
to the securities in the pension fund portfolio, thus allowing for the
possibility of a portfolio with some stocks and some bonds. This model
looks at the specific rules of ERISA and, assuming different types of
contracts (explicit or implicit) between firms and workers, draws impli-
cations for funding policy.
Let A =accruedpension benefits
F =fundedbenefitsS + B
FE =firmequity in the event of plan termination
(negative if the firm has to contribute funds)
The major differences between guaranteed and accrued benefits
are that (1) nonvested benefits are not guaranteed; (2) there is a limit -
tothe amount of benefits an individual can receive each year from the
PBGC; (3) benefit increases due to plan amendments only become gradually
guaranteed over a five year period.
The third item—that benefit increases only gradually become
guaranteed is extremely important for union pension plans. If a new con-
tract is signed every three years, then for two of every three years benefits
due to the last two new contracts are not fully guaranteed. For plans where
benefits are related to salary amendments tend to be much less frequent, ;o
virtually all vested benefits may be guaranteed. Eoever, as explained in21
Bulow [1979] salaried plans tend to be much better funded than union
plans and thus the guarantee of payoffs may well be much less valuable.
Under ERISA the firm's net equitY upon termination (pre—tax)
can be written as
(4.1)FEMax(F -A,Min(0, Max(F -C,—
Ifaccrued benefits are less than the amount of money in the
pension fund the firm can actually terminate the pension fund and get
money back. If accrued benefits are greater than funded benefits then
the workers get whatever is in the pension fund, subject to a minimum of
the guaranteed benefits. If pension assets are less than guaranteed
benefits the firm has to make up the difference up to 30 percent of the
firm's net worth, where net worth is the market value of the firm's
equity according to the PBGC opinion letters.
The value of the workers' claim upon termination is
(4.2) T =Max(C,Min(A, F))
Taking the PBGC rules literally, we can now look at the explicit
position of the firm and the workers under various funding levels, and
examine investment policy. As a first approximation we will follow Bulow
[1979] and assume constant renegotiation of pension benefits and funding
policy, and assume A, E, F, and C change continuously. The advantage of
this approach is that no "boundaries" get crossed so that if, for example,
F >Aat the beginning of a period F >Aalso at the end of the period
(an instant later). After going through the analysis with this approxima-
tion the effect of modifying this assumption will be discussed.22
TABLE 1
RISK BEARING OF PENSION FUT ASSET VALUES
1. F<G—.3E PBGC
2. C —. 3E<F<C Stockholders
3. C<F<A Employees
4. A <F Stockholders
Table 1 summarizes which party bears the risk of changes in
pension fund asset values for various levels of funding.
If a plan is significantly underfunded (line 1: F <C—.3E)
the firm is liable for 30 percent of its equity and the PBGC is left
having to pay the balance. If a fir-rn is in such a situation (where it
plans to eventually exercise the pension put or, like Chrysler, may find
it advantageous in its dealings with the government to at least have the
threat of putting a large liability—--even if the threat is never exercised)
it is only the PBCC's liability that is reduced by an increase in F.
Clearly, the fir-in has no compelling incentive to increase F through contri-
butions, so contributions to the plan would be minimized. In this analysis,
the fir-rn is indifferent to holding stocks or bonds in the portfolio, as
are the employees. This result will be modified later.
If C >F>G—.3Ethe workers will come out with C, the PBGC
will have no liability, and thus the firm has a fixed liability of C.
Consistent with the analysis of earlier sections, the firm would benefit
most by holding an all-bond portfolio.23
If A >F>Cthen workers benefits are worth F. The firm has
no interest in changes in plan value. Consequently, the fir-rn should be
willing to hold whatever assets the employees want. As Miller and Scholes
[1981] point out, despite the tax advantages of bondsemployees may well
choose to hold some equity in the fund under these circumstances. With
the Miller [1977] model the employees may choose to hold bonds plus call
options.
Finally, if F >Athe employees are fully protected: all benefits
will be paid off in the event of plan termination. In this case it is
again the firm which bears the risk of changes in plan asset values. The
firmhasa certain liability of A. Again, it would choose to hold all bonds
in the plan to get a maximum tax advantage.
The remainder of this section will discuss four questions related
to the funding decision in this extended Sharpe model. First, we have
always assumed that the aegal funding maximum has been independent of the
assets of the plan. There is a question as to whether this is true. Second,
empirically which of the four categories of level of funding are most firms
likely to fall into? A third related question is whether certain restricted
implicit agreements may change one's view of accrued benefits. Fourth, what
is the effect of allowing for the possibility that boundariesmay be crossed
so that, for example, a plan may change from being "underfunded" (F <A)to
being "overfunded" (F >A).
The first question is are the maximum funding level and the invest-
ment decision at all related? I have no good answer. However, consider an
extremely well funded plan such as IBM's, which manages to generally keep
all accrued benefits funded, with accrued benefits discounted at 4—3/4percent.
If IBM invested strictly in bonds with a yield to maturity of roughly three24
times the assumed interest rate, it would be quite clear that most of
the money in the IBM plan was there to fund not—yet accrued benefits.
It is at least possible that the firm would be forced to reduce its
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level of funding.
In answering the second question, as to which funding category
most plans fall into——one must differentiate between union and non—union
pension plans; or, more to the point, flat dollar versus salary—related
plans. In a flat dollar plan, benefits are raised every few years, and
a new unfunded liability is created. This liability will be funded over
ten to thirty years. Thus, there is always a large supply of unfunded
liabilities——especially in an era of inflation where new benefits may be
a high fraction of total benefits. Also, as mentioned earlier, there can
be a significant difference between guaranteed and accrued benefits in a
union plan. A flat dollar plan is likely to be at least somewhat under-
funded, unless its interest rate assumption is extremely low and the plan
has existed for a long time.
Plans in which benefits are tied to salary usually are well
funded. The actuarial reason is that such types of plans have salary
growth assumptions that are typically within a few percent of plan interest
rate assumptions. (The effective benefit growth assumptions for a flat
benefit type plan is zero.) The big increase in nominal interest rates
has reduced the present value of accrued benefits so that salaried plans
tend to be fully funded.
Additionally, because salaried plans do not need amendments to
raise benefits, guaranteed benefits differ from accrued benefits only
because of limits on individuals' annual benefits and the difference25
between accrued and vested benefits. This amount can be quite
small.
Salaried plans, then, appear to be usually overfunded (F >A)
and seldom in a situation where A >F>C.Thus, it is unlikely that
the plan should hold stocks unless there are some implicit agreements
between the employees and the employer that make accrued benefits an
understatement of employees' pension claims. Union plans are much more
likely to be in a situation where A >F>C,and even without any implicit
arrangements the employees bear the risk of changes in the value of
pension assets in that circumstance.
Finally, there is the question of what happens when contracts
are negotiated for long periods, so that "boundaries" may be crossed and
an underfunded plan may become an overfunded plan before any change in
policy occurs. First, it is important to note, as Miller and Scholes
[1981] emphasize, that equilibrium requires that firms cannot gain by
choosing funding policies that systematically take advantage of the stock-
holders. Funding policy is negotiated, so that no gain can be made at the
expense of the employees. Thus, the only participant in the pension fund
who can be gamed against is the government. Bowever, it is also important
to note that even if pension policy is negotiated it is important to have
some idea of what a given funding policy that has been negotiated provides
for the employees.
For a badly underfunded plan (F <C—. 3E)equity funding clearly
makes sense if bonds are highly correlated with C. Portfolio variance is
inrreased and the firm has a better chance of reducing its liability.
Ideally, it might only wishtohold one stock, but prudent manrulesmay26
require it to hold many. In such cases where the amount of any given
stock held is limited it is possible that the firm may wishtohold
some types of bonds. That is, if the firm is constrained by "prudent
man" requirements to hold at least 100 securities it is quite possible
that the portfolio which maximizes the value of the pension put may
include a number of securities that are bonds. This is because short
tern bonds are not a close hedge against pension liabilities, which are
like bonds with extremely long durations. The way to maximize the value
of the pension put is to create a portfolio with as low a correlation
(preferably a negative correlation) as possible with the pension liabilities.
It is important to note here that there is no particular incentive
for the firm to exercise its pension put so long as its minimum legal
requirements for maintaining the plan are less than the value of newly
guaranteed benefits. One reason firms may not be exercising now, then,
is that it might be even more attractive to exercise later.
Consider a firmthatis thinking of exercising its pension put
(F +.3E<C).The costs of delaying exercise are (1) the minimum
contributions to the plan that the firm will be required to make plus
(2) any premia that must be paid to the PBGC. The benefits to delay are
that (1) any newly accrued guaranteed benefits directly reduce labor costs
because employees can regard such compensation as certain to be paid;(2)
if the pension portfolio does well the firm can keep any increase in the
value of F beyond G —. 3E;and (3) any dividends that are paid on the firm's
stock reduce the market value of the PBCC's claim on the firm's assets,
because this claim is not dividend—protected. It is possible that F +.3E < C
but it is still in the firms' interest to keep their plans operating.27
This type of analysis is a realistic depiction of the PBCC's
problem in writing tougher rules for pension plan contributions, and
for setting the terms under which multi—employer plans (generally
greatly underfunded) can enter the insurance system. By making the
cost of staying in the system more expensive the PBCC encourages immediate
terminations. However, not getting tough has even greater costs. The
market value of the PBGC's liability is exactly the negative of the market
value to the firm of the pension put. If this put has a positive value
the only way to forestall exercise is to make the terms for continuation
sufficiently lenient that the firm's claim upon continuing the plan has
at least as great a present value as it would upon immediate termination.
The fact that few firms with substantially underfunded plans
actually do terminate does not dilute the value of the pension put even
without the above argument. The firm can be compensated for not terminating
its pension fund through the behavior of other government agencies besides
the PBGC.
One of the reasons for the Chrysler loan guarantees may have been
to save the PBCC from bankruptcy through a Chrysler default. While de facto
Chrysler has not terminated its pension plan it may have gotten full benefit
from its option to terminate.
With modest uriderfunding (G —. 3E<F<C)a portfolio of all
bonds also limits employees' benefits to C.It is conceivable they would
be willing to compensate the firm for lost tax benefits (less increase in
value of the pension put) in return for the firm placing some stock in
the portfolio. With C —. 3E<F<Cif F is clcse to C —. 3Ethe firm
may prefer stocks just to take advantage of the pension put, and if F is
near G employees may encourage the firm to hold some stocks so that benefits28
might possibly rise in value above G. The stockholders would be compensated
for the employees' call on the pension assets and the net cost (lost tax
benefits plus change in value of pension put) through including equity in
the portfolio.
In these cases of lost tax benefits the employees and employer
would clearly jointly gain if they could establish an implicit agreement
with the firm to hold some stocks for the employees' benefit outside the
pension plan and to hold bonds for the employer's benefit within the plan.
Also, as mentioned earlier, according to the Miller [1977] model holding
bonds and options will dominate holding an equally risky stock portfolio
for the employees, in the case where no implicit agreements are possible.
If C <F<Athe employees get to put the assets to the employers
if assets fall below G and the employers get to exercise a call on the
assets if assets rise above A. As employees hold more stock in the plan
the value of the pension put falls and of the pension call call rises.
Finally, if F >Ait is hard to see any reason to hold
stocks. Throughout this analysis G and A have been assumed to be
constants. It should be emphasized that, as extremely long—term
obligations, G and A fluctuate perhaps more rapidly than do pension
assets.
Summarizing, if the explicit analysis is carried through,
nonunion plans will generally find F >A,in which case all debt financing
seems called for. The exceptions to this rule would be caused by (a)
implicit pension liabilities exceeding the explicit liabilities; or (b)
institutional constraints on what a prudent portfolio may consist of.
In a flat dollar plan, however, it appears very likely that the workers29
will be responsible for any change in pension asset values. In that case,
the firm will be indifferent as to what is held in the plan and will hold
whatever the employees desire.
Conclusion
Several models of pension liabilities have been presented here.
The basic conclusions are as follows: In the Black—Tepper model the
present value of the employee's claim is independent of the pension fund
portfolio, and the possibility of making money from a plan termination
is ignored. The stockholders gain or lose from any change in pension fund
asset values, and wish that those assets be held in bonds because either
(a) with a Miller {1977] model bonds earnings the pre—tax rate of return
are a positive net present value investment or (b) with a debt capacity
model, bonds in the plan may increase debt capacity.
The original Sharpe model also gives employees a claim with a
value independent of the value of the firm's pension portfolio. However,
the firm also holds a valuable pension put. The firm will wish to either
fund as little as possible and hold all stocks (assuming that stocks have a
lower correlation with pension liabilities than do any fixed income
securities), thereby taking advantage of the pension put, or fund as much
as possible and hold all bonds for the Black—Tepper reasons.
Under the Miller—Scholes model the employees have a complex implicit
claim on the firm. If that claim includes whatever assets are in the pension
fund, then the stockholders cannot gain by altering the pension portfolio.
(Under the assumptions of the Miller [1977] model, however, the employees
will gain from having bonds plus options rather than stocks and bonds.)30
However, if it is merely that the employees hold a claim which
may be hedged by holding stocks in the pension fund, then in the Miller—
Scholes model also the firm should try to hold as many bonds as possible
in the pension plan and, if hedging the pension liability is desirable,
the liability should be hedged either with stocks outside the pension
plan or, under the Miller [1977] model, with call options in the pension
portfolio.
The extended Sharpe model, which looks at the explicit terms of
ERISA, notes that if the market value of pension fund assets exceeds the
present value of guaranteed benefits but is less than the present value
of accrued benefits, then the employees have a claim worth exactly the
market value of the pension fund's assets. Many union plans may have
assets in this range. In such a situation the firm will be happy to let
the employees choose investment policy. Outside this range, the extended
Sharpe model yields the same strategy as the original Sharpe model: either
all stocks or all bonds, depending on whether the pension put or the tax
advantage of bonds is more valuable.
In general, if the Miller [1977] model is assumed, then if firms
are the beneficial owners of any assets in the pension fund they would
want those assets to be held as bonds if the plan is well funded (to
maximize tax advantages) and as stocks if the "pension put" becomes more
important. If the employees are the beneficial owners of the assets they
may wish any combination of stocks and bonds, as in a defined contribution
plan. If the Miller model is assumed, then the tax advantage of holding
bonds is indirect, and the argument must be made that holding bonds in the
plan increases firm "debt capacity" and allows for more on—balance sheet debt.31
Clearly, the important question to be answered is who in fact
does bear the risk of changes in pension asset values. That question
is answered in a slightly different manner in each of the above models.32
FOOTNOTES
1. The crucial elements about Black and Tepper's view of the pension
liability are that (1) the workers negotiate a claim whose value
is independent of the pension fund's performance, and (2) the
possibility of gaining at the expense of the PBCC is ignored.
They can accoimnodate views of implicit pension contracts, so long
as the contracts do not make the terminal value of benefits dependent
upon fund performance.
The same results can also be achieved by making assumptions about
worker preferences. For example, a stronger than needed assumption
would have, workers indifferent among all streams of pension benefits
with the identical present value. Then the problem of the firm could
be thought of as how to minimize the present value of pensioncosts,
given the present value of pension liabilities, the tax laws, and the
stipulation of ignoring the PBGC.
2. However, to the extent that such firms can sell off their tax shelters
to other firms in the normal corporate tax bracket these firms benefit
equally from extra debt capacity. Therefore, only if the firm could
not dispose of its tax benefits would there be no advantage to holding
bonds. Since many firms (especially financial institutions) are in
low but positive average tax brackets and high marginal brackets (see,
e.g., Feldstein and Summers [1979]) every year despite changes in
income, one might assume that in fact some of these firms are able to
dispose of excess tax shelters.
3.Fischer Black has pointed out to me that the effectiveness of such
funds has been reduced by Revenue Ruling 80—345. Rhile in principle
these funds can in fact turn much interest income into dividends, it
should be noted that very substantial portfolio turnovermay be
necessary to achieve this purpose.
4. As a technicality, the percentage'is more like 3/13, or 23 percent.
If a firm has a market value of $10 million it can be liable for
$3 million. If stockholders anticipate this payout the market value
of equity will only be $10 million if it would be $13 million without
the pension payout.
5. This approach was suggested to me by Nyron Scholes.
6. This assumes that the PBGC values guaranteed benefits at market for
the purposes of assessing firm liability. Actually, the PBCC has its
ownsetof interest assumptions derived from looking at insurance
company rates which tend to be quite conservative (averaging about
eight percent at the end of 1980). For the consequences of this effect,
see Bulow [1979].33
7. For example, if stocks are more highly correlated with the price of
annuities than short term bonds are, then holding short term bonds
is the way to maximize the value of the pension put. This may be
true if the stock market tends to fall in response to an increase
in long term nominal interest rates.
8. However, as long as the amount of interest income the firm could
receive would increase, the net tax impact of such a move would
still be favorable.34
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